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Iustum. Moral nihilism is also disagreeable, although that might also be a semantic difference. I think morality exists as people's internal processes

Ferbalot. I agree that people have thoughts, feelings and motivations about morality. By "moral nihilist" I mean that there's no genuine oughts, nothing truly obligating us to act in accordance with moral maxims. There are majorities of people who hold certain views and systems to enforce them, but none of that gives us an "ought" as it is traditionally used in ethics I think.

Iust. Can you expand on the idea that nothing obligates us to act per moral maxims; what does it mean to ought to do something?

Ferb. By "ought to do x" I mean "be obligated to do x in a rationally action-compelling sense." In other words, if a perfectly rational person ought to do something, they would (assuming they have the relevant information and stuff) do it. In other words, it's best to do it in a way that we really have reason to care about in a fundamental way.

Iust. Would rationality not obligate us to act per moral maxims, then?

Ferb. I tentatively think it would, though I've heard different definitions for morality given in which it wouldn't. The first quote you gave ("...nothing truly obligating us to act in accordance with moral maxims.") is my position. The second quote you gave ("...perfectly rational person ought to do something, they would...") is a description of what a genuine ought would look like, in my opinion. My position is that no genuine objective moral oughts/maxims exist. Only subjective feelings/thoughts that are ultimately arbitrary and unable to give any rational indication of what objectively should be done.

Iust. I love the distinction you made between a position and the best hypothesis of an ought. You stated: "Only subjective feelings/thoughts that are ultimately arbitrary and unable to give any rational indication of what objectively should be done." If something obligates us to act per moral maxims, would it have to be objective?

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Ferb. It depends how you define "obligate" in my opinion. I like the standard of whether a perfectly rational omniscient being would act differently based on that knowledge. If they would, I consider it objective. If they wouldn't, at best I consider it subjective.

Iust. When you say it depends on how someone defines "obligate," are you saying that what obligates us to act per moral maxims can be objective or subject, or depends on how obligation is defined? The latter half of your statement implies the former.

Ferb. I meant that it depends on how "obligation" is defined, but I prefer an objective rather than subjective definition. In most cases, at least. But I'm ok with using a different definition for the sake of discussion.

Iust. If obligations are objective, then I agree with you that there are no genuine oughts, nothing truly obligating us per objective moral maxims. I would be a moral nihilist if we defined moral obligations as objective. However, do you still hold the same view when moral obligations are subjective; is nothing obligating us per subjective moral maxims?

Ferb. If morality is defined in subjective terms then I wouldn't say it obligates us in a sense that rationally justifies acting in one way over another. Since it would ultimately just be descriptive (and maybe emotionally appealing) without having anything that would justify acting differently. But if we define "obligate" in a sense that would not cause a perfectly rational omniscient entity to act differently, then I think I have no problem conceding that we have subjective moral obligations.

Iust. We are then virtually in agreement on moral nihilism. I am still curious about a few things: are subjective and objective moral obligations forms of moral obligations?

Ferb. I do consider subjective and objective moral obligations to be forms of moral obligations, yes. Hmm but I would normally say "moral obligation" to specifically refer to an objective moral obligation. Unless I'm in a discussion where the other person defines it more broadly or subjectively or something.

Iust. Especially in philosophical discourse, do you think people should use more precise language?

Ferb. Yes, especially in philosophical discourse I think people should use more precise language.

Iust. Do you think using "moral obligation" in isolation to mean objective and subjective moral obligations is precise?

Ferb. No, I don't think using "moral obligation" in isolation to mean both objective and subjective moral obligations is precise, unless the context makes it clear which one you mean at which point. Most of the time I try to make the context make it clear that I'm using the objective definition if I use the term without "objective", but usually I try to avoid the term as long as possible in the first place.

Iust. I still do not understand. If "moral obligation" includes subjective and objective obligations, then using "moral obligation" to mean both seems more precise. Could you explain more clearly?

Ferb. "Moral obligation" is a similarly ambiguous term to "free will". It has become the norm to use "free will" to describe several different concepts (mainly libertarian or compatibilist free will) in different contexts, and it's more unusual to use the term to describe a concept that would apply to all the common definitions. So insofar as precisely communicating what we mean goes, I think as long as the context makes it sufficiently clear, it's more precise to use "free will" to describe a specific form. In the same way, I tentatively believe "moral responsibility" is usually defined either objectively or subjectively, and I think it's less common for it to be used to mean a concept that applies to both forms. So with sufficient context, I think it's more precise to use a more specific definition in accordance with convention. * All of this largely applying to relatively educated circles. For ordinary people I think it is more common to use more broad/unspecific definitions.

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Iust. Would you say that if a word's precision depends on context, the said precision is not in isolation?