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Iustum. There might be minor but concrete disagreements on atheism.

Ferbalot. What sort of disagreements about atheism might you expect?

Iust. I do not believe some god exists, and I do not believe no god exists. Essentially, I do not believe in a god but have not explicitly rejected such belief.

Ferb. That makes sense. I do believe that no gods exist because I believe that: 1. Occam's Razor can be applied to theism. 2. Theism is a more complex (specific) hypothesis than many alternatives. Which of these do you disagree with?

Iust. Occam's razor applies to theism. I do not know what you mean when stating: "Theism is a more complex (specific) hypothesis than many alternatives." Assuming you mean claim when saying hypothesis, then I would disagree. Let us examine these two claims: Some god exists (The theist position). No god exists. Both claims are equally complex, as both propositions have the same subject. Furthermore, these claims are a true dichotomy as they negate each other; both encapsulate all possible hypotheses except the claim: "every god exists." Although, I doubt theists claim every god exists.

[12-Day Delay]

Ferb. In calling theism a "hypothesis" I mean to refer to how the claim is used as a hypothesis for lots of questions about what we observe. I am using the definition of "complexity" relevant to Occam's Razor, which is more like specificity. The idea is that less specific hypotheses contain more overall hypotheses, and so are more likely than all of those more specific hypotheses that are a part of it. Eg. "I'll drive to work and pop a tire" is a more specific (and less likely) claim than "I'll drive to work", because "I'll drive to work" contains that possibility and another possibility: "I'll drive to work and not pop a tire." Of course theism is not a subset of atheism, however it is a much more specific claim. Because theism contains many parts: "There is something outside of the universe.", "Among that something is a causal system.", "That causal system is organized in exactly the sort of way required to function as a kind of complex brain/mind.", "That brain/mind is omnipotent.", etc. Atheism is the position we arrive at if any of these claims are false. Theism only works if all of these claims are true, meaning (in the absence of other evidence) theism is more specific. Without other evidence, we should default to saying that each of these sorts of statements is a 50/50 (unless they can be broken down further or something like that). The only reason that the statement "God exists." looks so simple (unspecific) is that we've gotten very accustomed to the specific (and massive) collection of irreducible claims that make up the claim "God exists." It's like saying "There is a 6x3x1 meter cut and polished blue ruby with a radio embedded in it that's playing a taped recording of Blue's Clues in the Milky Way." in a world where it's very common to believe this specific set of claims, and we have a shorthand for it and think of it as a single irreducible claim. But of course for every detail we add, we are by default making it less and less likely to be true. It doesn't matter if we call it Bluerubyism and treat it like a single irreducible claim, that doesn't make it by default just as likely as abluerubyism. Because abluerubism contains way more possibilities. If the tiny is 6x3x2 meters, abluerubyism is correct. If it's playing a different thing on the radio, abluerubyism wins again. Likewise if there's a being outside of the universe that knows everything, loves us, watches over us but is completely powerless and very imperfect, atheism is still correct. If there's an all-powerful thing outside of the universe but it doesn't have a brain, atheism is correct. If there's something outside of the universe but it lacks anything like causality, the processes required for a personality are impossible and atheism is correct. And of course of nothing outside of the universe exists, atheism is also correct. The only way that theism works is via a very narrow window of many, many more irreducible claims.

Iust. It sounds like you're defining "hypothesis" as a claim that explains various questions people have. Furthermore, the proposition "some god is existing" has underlying irreducible claims of god. To essentially claim "some god is existing" could mean "some entity that created the universe who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving is existing." That makes it a more complex or specific hypothesis. Atheism, on the other hand, is a position where that hypothesis is false. Consequently, if the god has the characteristics mentioned before except for omnipotence, then atheism would turn out to be correct. Meaning: if the proposition that some god exists means an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient entity exists, the atheist position could be that there is no omniscient entity, which would, therefore, have less irreducible claims. Is this characterization correct?

Ferb. As a proposed explanation for a given question, yes. I believe that is at least equivalent to the most common definition. And yes, I believe you essentially characterized my argument about Occam's Razor correctly. I think the only thing I might change is that atheism is usually understood to be more than a lack of theism, it's also taken to be contrary to deism I think. And I believe that omnibenevolence (and maybe some other attributes you mentioned) aren't in every theist deity, probably only classical theist deities. So technically I wouldn't include those attribute(s), only the list(s) that definitionally contradict atheism.

Iust. What do you mean by: "...only the list(s) that definitionally contradict atheism"? Are you saying that there are inherent attributes of god that can contradict atheism?

Ferb. I believe there are collections of attributes of deities in theism that would contradict atheism, not not individual attributes I think.

Iust. Oh, you are saying that in every instance of theism, there are attributes placed upon god that would contradict atheism. However, there is no attribute all-encompassing every usage of a god of every theist. Is that correct?

Ferb. No. I'm saying that there is a list of attributes of deities that (when put together) contradicts atheism, but no individual attribute (such as omnipotence) that would inherently contradict atheism.

Iust. I'm sorry, but I don't understand the difference between my and your restatement. May you rephrase what I said and what you said and compare them to show the difference?

Ferb. Reading this more, I may have just been misunderstanding what you meant by "all-encompassing". You could have been using it in a way that meant "sufficient", I think. But here's what I came up with until I realized that (assuming it is the case): Your original statement: "Oh, you are saying that in every instance of theism, there are attributes placed upon god that would contradict atheism. However, there is no attribute all-encompassing every usage of a god of every theist. Is that correct" The relevant part of your statement restated: "There is no attribute that encompasses every usage of 'god' for every theist." - i.e. "No X is necessary for theism." (Technically more like "no X is necessary for all forms of theism currently believed", but I think you get the idea). The relevant part of my statement restated: "There is no attribute (such as omnipotence) that would alone be sufficient to counter atheism." - I.e. "No X is sufficient for non-atheism." 1. "Necessary" does not imply "sufficient". I hold that there are individual attributes that are necessary for theism, but no individual attributes that are sufficient for it. 2. Non-atheism isn't necessarily theism, it could be deism.

Iust. When I said: "… there is no attribute all-encompassing every usage of a god of every theist," what I meant was no one attribute contradictory to atheism is necessary for all god conceptions. Do you still disagree with this statement? It seems what you are saying no one attribute is sufficient for a god conception and some collection of attributes is necessary for a god conception. Is that correct?

Ferb. That makes sense, I don't still disagree with "there is no attribute all-encompassing every usage of a god of every theist". And yes, I believe that is a correct interpretation of what I said.

Iust. Okay, I agree with what you laid out: Occam's Razor applies to the claim that some god exists and that the claim is a more complex hypothesis. I disagree with how you explain or convey what you laid out, but that is more tangential. What is the point of what you laid out? Also, to ease communication, could we refer to that claim as [1] or P1 rather than theism or deism?

Ferb. I was providing a counterargument to your earlier claim about [1]'s and atheism's central claims being equally complex in Occam's Razor terms.

[22-Day Delay]

Iust. Correct, and I concede. There was a point you were making before my counter-argument. What was the point?